a positive feature peculiar to existent things rather than nonexistent things except by another positive feature peculiar to existent things. Likewise, if explanation is intended to mean necessary implication, then5 a positive feature cannot entail something that entails nonexistence, since this would require nonexistence to entail existence, whereas nonexistence cannot entail existence. Thus, neither vision nor the possibility of being co-located or spatially separate can entail anything involving nonexistence, whether that is origination itself or something that necessarily entails origination, since both entail nonexistence.

Existence entails nonexistence only insofar as it entails an existence that excludes something else; in that case, nonexistence is the opposite of existence. But for the existence of the very kind of positive feature to depend upon an existence required to be nonexistent—this is impossible.

His statement, “Everything originated can truly be described as admitting of nonexistence and existence. Likewise, for something to be divided into the co-located and the spatially separate,” and so on, may be answered as follows: This is mistaken in several respects.

First, what is originated and can be seen is what exists, not what does not exist, for the nonexistent cannot be seen. Nor can the visibility of existence, divided into the co-located and the spatially separate, be explained on the grounds that it is originated and divided into the existent and the nonexistent. For the originated, when understood to include the nonexistent, cannot be seen