“Every existent must admit of sensory indication, either in its own right or derivatively, and for any two existents, indicating one must either be identical to indicating the other or be different from it”; or else its scope is narrower than that of existence. If it is coextensive with existence, the desired conclusion follows. The same holds all the more if its scope is broader, since the argument would then establish two things: that it admits of sensory indication and that it is spatially separate from the world.

If admitting of sensory indication is narrower in scope than existence, such that some existents admit of sensory indication while others do not, then, if the necessarily existent falls within that category, the argument likewise holds. If it does not, admitting of sensory indication necessarily entails origination. Thus, taking sensory indication as the explanatory ground amounts to taking something that necessarily entails origination as that ground, as we shall explain, Allah willing.

As for his statement in the second line of argument:

“Substances and accidents share the feature by virtue of which they differ from the Creator. Why, then, could this not be what accounts for their admitting of division into what is spatially separate and what is co-located? In that case, his statement, ‘They have nothing in common except origination,’ is invalidated.”