that does not fall under the designation “necessarily existent” is originated. Thus, the cause must be either origination itself or something that presupposes origination, such as something more specific than origination; or it must be existence or something that encompasses necessary existence. This division rests on affirmation and negation, and this is the actual import of their statement: “Either existence or origination.”
This precise formulation makes clear the answer to the fifth question, namely, his statement:
“We do not concede that we have found no cause for this judgment other than origination or existence. This can be explained in two ways. First, it might be said that what warrants our assertion that a thing is either co-located with the world or spatially separate from it is that it admits of sensory indication. For any two things that admit of sensory indication, indicating one must either be identical to indicating the other or be different from it.”
He may be told in reply: A thing’s admitting of sensory indication is either coextensive with existence in scope, such that it may be said: