in its fullest form may sometimes yield certainty, just as it yields strong probability at other times. This is a point that may be made in various contexts. The assertion that testimony concerning a negation cannot be based on knowledge is incorrect. Rather, a negation can sometimes be known, just as an affirmation can be known.

Second, it may be said that this yields strong conviction and a high degree of probability. This is fair and just, and better than claiming to possess conclusive demonstrations that, upon examination, prove to be specious arguments and false imaginings. Whoever says, “In this field, one may argue only from conclusive evidence that admits of no contrary possibility,” may first be told: You yourself are the first to violate this principle, for you constantly invoke arguments that do not yield even a high degree of probability, let alone certainty.

He may secondly be told: We do not concede this. Rather, everyone is obliged to put forward what is true. If someone possesses certain knowledge, he should speak on that basis. In questions over which human beings disagree, it is better for a person to reach a judgment of high probability than to remain in confusion and ignorance, or to rely on imitation or fallacious arguments, as so often happens. We shall, Allah willing, address this in our discussion of