is himself mistaken. This is like saying that an existent must be either eternal or originated, either a creator or created. This applies specifically to what exists: what does not exist is neither eternal nor originated, neither a creator nor created. Thus, the necessity that one of the two categories apply is a judgment common to both, and being existent as such is common to both.

The second answer is that they said that existents in the observable realm are divided into those coincident with another and those separate from another. Dividing something into two categories constitutes a single judgment, whereas the judgment peculiar to one category differs from that peculiar to the other. Grant, then, that the necessity of being separate is explained by its being a substance, and the necessity of being coincident is explained by its being an accident. Nevertheless, what they have in common—the necessary applicability of the division, susceptibility to it, and the necessity of division into substance and accident—is a judgment common to both.

This common judgment must be explained by what is common, rather than by the judgment peculiar to either category. For the necessity and inevitability of the division, susceptibility to it, and being such as to divide into two categories all concern the subject of the division. The subject of the division is common to its categories, so it must be explained by what they have in common. Thus, what is divided is the existent as such, not the existence of substance specifically, nor the existence of