different judgments. The distinction is clear between dividing existents into what is self-subsisting and separate from another—namely, substance—and what subsists in another and is coincident with it—namely, accident—and saying that every existent, in relation to another, must either be separate from it or coincident with it. The same applies to saying that an existent, insofar as it exists, must subsist either in itself or in another. This is a single judgment concerning an existent, whereas the former involves two different judgments.

This single judgment constitutes what they have in common and is the basis of the division. Those two judgments constitute what differentiates them: what distinguishes one category from the other. The single shared judgment—that one of the two necessarily applies and that the division is into these two—follows from the existence common to both, whereas the particular judgment follows from the particular category. Thus, being specifically self-subsisting is a judgment concerning the particular kind that is substance, while specifically subsisting in another is a judgment concerning the other particular kind, namely accident.

There is no doubt that the specific character of being a substance or an accident can account for what is peculiar to substance and accident respectively. But the necessity that one of the two judgments apply to every pair of existents, or to every existent, and the fact that an existent or a pair of existents cannot lack both these descriptions—this judgment shared by both cannot be explained by what is specific to substance or what is specific to accident.

This is not the claim that existents in the observable realm are divided into these two categories; thus, it is not a division of a whole into its parts. It has therefore become clear that what they said is not mistaken, but he