of the attribute inhering in it. Its receptivity to that receptivity would therefore be additional to it, entailing an infinite regress.”

The reply is that receptivity to division, and other such attributes, means that this is possible in the essence itself. The possibility of a thing does not require a further possibility. This attribute is inseparable from the essence; the essence is not receptive to it in the sense that the attribute may either exist or be absent. Rather, receptivity necessarily belongs to the essence and is inseparable from it. Here, receptivity means the absence of impossibility—that is, possibility in the broad sense, which includes what is necessary—whereas the former signifies possibility in the strict sense. Thus, if one of the two kinds of receptivity is possibility in the strict sense, while the other is possibility in the broad sense and signifies necessity, the latter amounts to necessity. An attribute’s necessarily belonging to its subject entails no infinite regress. The error arose only from the expressions “equivocity” and “receptivity.”

Fourth: Grant that receptivity is a negative determination. As for his statement, “It cannot be causally explained,” the reply is that causal explanation here means mutual entailment. It does not mean that one of the two is independent of the other and necessitates it. In this respect, each may validly be both entailed by and entail the other.