already in existence, but the description depends on the other, as is similarly the case with being a paternal or maternal uncle. This leads some to suppose that it is a mere relation, whereas the truth is that one of the two attributes came into existence before the other.

It is well known that a person’s having been born and separated from his father and mother is not a divisible cause, such that one could speak of a third or a quarter of a birth—I mean when his entire body has emerged. Since birth is not divisible, neither are fatherhood and sonship, such that one could speak of a third of fatherhood or a third of sonship, just as one does not speak of half of animality, humanity, rationality, or the like.

It thus becomes clear that fatherhood, which is a positive attribute, is co-located with the Lord’s essence, like other attributes. How could it be otherwise, when fatherhood is among the greatest attributes subsisting in the father, changing him in a manner perceptible to the senses through the love, tenderness, affection, and similar feelings toward his child that arise in him—feelings that other attributes do not entail? It therefore has a stronger claim than other attributes to subsist in him.

As for the second objection, namely his statement, “For a thing to be such that we can truly say of it, ‘Either it is or it is not,’ indicates that it admits of division into these alternatives. Admitting of division is a negative determination and therefore cannot have a cause”—there are several answers to this: