As for the arguments he has mentioned, there are several replies to them.

First, arguing for that conclusion is unacceptable, for it calls into question the most evident, necessarily known truths of sensory perception.

Second, this author and all the other groups adhering to the truth agree that these arguments are invalid. He is among the most vigorous opponents of the philosophers’ claim that there exist substances not co-located with anything else, and of the Muʿtazilah’s claim that there exist accidents not co-located with anything else. Indeed, people have long described this as one of the gravest contradictory impossibilities affirmed by the Muʿtazilah: they affirmed volitions and aversions that subsist in no subject. This position commits them to accepting that the remaining accidents can likewise exist without a subject, and undermines their foundational principles generally.

Third, it may be said that the proof they have presented—that any two existents must either be spatially separate or co-located—constitutes an argument against