particular thing, whether a kind or an individual, shares with the seeing of other things the general character of seeing, while differing in the particular character of seeing that kind or individual. Likewise, the object seen shares with other objects the fact that it exists and is visible, while differing in its particular kind and individual identity. Thus, the shared, unrestricted property—seeing as such—depends on what is common to visible things, whereas the specific property—a particular instance of seeing—depends on what is peculiar to each kind and individual separately.

This clarification answers the objection raised there that seeing may depend on what is peculiar to the object seen, as when the seeing of substances and accidents is made dependent on what is peculiar to accidents. For once it is understood that seeing, like visible things, is a genus encompassing different kinds, and that the general and unrestricted is related to the general and unrestricted, while the specific and qualified is related to the specific and qualified, this and other objections are dispelled. Whatever would invalidate the cause and demonstrate its lack of causal efficacy is thereby removed.

Since this is so, and the ground for seeing is shared, what is common to