that cannot be predicated of the nonexistent and is not exclusive to deficient beings. It is therefore an attribute of perfection, which Allah must possess, and this entails His being distinct from the world.

It is already clear, however, that we have not set out here the arguments advanced by those who affirm the divine attributes. Rather, we have discussed what al-Rāzī stated and its implications. We have thus explained that the substance of this analogical argument concerning vision is that we see things because they exist, and Allah—glorified and exalted be He—exists; indeed, His existence is more perfect. It must therefore be possible to see Him.

The argument may be summarized as follows: we undoubtedly see existing things, including substances and accidents, such as colours and magnitudes—length, shortness, and the like—but not nonexistent things. The fact that vision pertains exclusively to what exists, rather than to what does not exist, entails that the ground for the possibility of being seen pertains exclusively to existence. This means that the existent and the nonexistent cannot be alike with respect to being seen. Were they alike in this respect, they could not differ such that one is seen while the other is not.

Thus, when we say that the cause or ground of being seen pertains exclusively to existence, we do not mean to posit a cause or factor additional to the reality of the existing thing that makes it possible to see it. This was mistakenly supposed by one who said: “Some judgments admit a causal explanation and others do not; being seen may therefore be among those judgments that admit no causal explanation.” Rather, what is meant is that the possibility of seeing one of the two categories but not the other entails that they differ in this respect and are not alike