with his ears, those things are particular and existent. The intellect then abstracts from them an unrestricted, universal concept: it apprehends hunger in general, joy in general, smell in general, pain in general, and so forth. These universals are purely intelligible, for no unrestricted universals exist externally such that they could be perceived by the senses. Sense perception concerns only things that exist.

This is why they say that He has a general [knowledge] of nonexistent things before they come into being, whereas hearing and sight concern only what exists. As for whoever says that He sees … We have discussed this at length elsewhere.

That being so, anyone who intends this meaning places Him among things that exist in the mind, not in external reality. This is the true import of the position of the Jahmiyyah, who say that He cannot be seen or perceived by the senses. For everything that exists and subsists in itself can be seen; indeed, everything that exists can be perceived by the senses, whether through sight or otherwise. Whatever cannot be apprehended through any of the senses is therefore nothing but nonexistent. Even mental images can be perceived insofar as they themselves exist; but insofar as they correspond