the external world. This is blameworthy imagining: a person imagines something that has no actual existence. As for imagining things that do exist—as in a sleeper’s dream that corresponds to external reality—this is neither blameworthy nor objectionable; rather, it is valid in its own sphere. Imagining existing, sensible things as they actually exist in the external world is true both inwardly and outwardly. Denying this is sophistry, just as denying the existence of sensible things is.

Eleventh point:

His phrase:

“The concomitants of sense perception”

If he means that sense perception does not reach Him—that is, it neither perceives nor encompasses Him—then neither sense perception nor reason encompasses Him, so sense perception is not unique in this respect. But if he means that He cannot be sensed, meaning that He cannot be seen, this is rejected and false. They do not openly deny this, although in reality they agree with those who deny it. Were this the place to discuss it, we would do so.

Twelfth point:

His phrase:

“The concomitants of sense perception and the associations of imagination”

apparently refers to whatever accompanies sense perception. He must mean either to deny of Him whatever accompanies sense perception or sensible things, and whatever is connected with imagination or imagining; or that sense perception does not reach Him and imagination does not attach to Him.

If he means the first—which is what the wording entails—it would follow that whatever