its particular essence precludes that judgment. If so, why may it not be said that, although existence entails that a thing is either co-located with something else or separate from it, the distinctive nature of His essence, exalted is He, precludes this judgment? Why, then, must His existence entail that He is either co-located with the world or separate from it in a spatial direction?

Ninth question: The proof you have presented applies in many cases where the resulting conclusion is unquestionably false. This shows that the proof is refuted by counterexamples, as can be demonstrated in several ways.

First: Everything other than Allah is temporally originated, so the possibility of temporal origination is a judgment shared by both. We therefore say: This possibility is a shared judgment and must have a shared cause. What they share is either temporal origination or existence. Temporal origination cannot account for the possibility of temporal origination, because that possibility is prior to temporal origination in order, and what is prior to a thing in order cannot be explained by what is posterior to that thing. Thus, the possibility of temporal origination is not caused by temporal origination; it must therefore be caused by existence. Yet Allah, exalted is He, exists, so the possibility of temporal origination would necessarily apply to Him—which is impossible.

Second: Everything that exists in the observable realm is either a spatial magnitude or something subsisting