his ignorance of the existence of this world.

Second: If ignorance of the cause entailed ignorance of the effect, knowledge of the cause would entail knowledge of the effect. On this supposition, if existence were what required two existent things in the observable realm to be either spatially coincident or spatially separate, anyone who knew that something existed would necessarily know that it must be either spatially coincident with the world or spatially separate from it. Yet the vast majority—those who affirm Allah’s oneness—believe that He, exalted is He, exists, without knowing that He must be either spatially coincident with the world or spatially separate from it. Following this line of reasoning, therefore, existence cannot be the basis of this judgment.

Our scholar, the eminent Ibn Fūrak, raised this objection against Ibn al-Haysam, who could offer no answer to it beyond saying: “It is impossible to have knowledge of the effect while remaining ignorant of its cause.” He spoke at length in explaining this distinction, but nothing intelligible emerged that could be recounted.

His third statement is: “Its being temporally originated is an attribute established by inference, whereas its being either