fatherhood is an existent attribute distinct from the father’s essence. Once this is established, we say that it is impossible to maintain that fatherhood is spatially coincident with the father’s essence. Otherwise, one would have to say that half of fatherhood inheres in half of the father, and a third of fatherhood in a third of him. This is known to be false. Nor is it possible to say that fatherhood is separate from the father’s essence in direction and spatial location. Otherwise, fatherhood would have to be a self-subsisting substance spatially separate from the father’s essence, which is likewise impossible. This argument thus establishes the existence of something that can neither be described as spatially coincident with the world nor as spatially separate from it. Once this is established, their claim is refuted.

The second objection: We concede that, of any two things existing in the observable world, one must either be spatially coincident with the other or spatially separate from it. Yet for something to be such that our statement, “Either it is or it is not,” holds true of it indicates that it admits of division into these two alternatives. Susceptibility to division, however, is a negative determination, and nonexistence does not admit of causal explanation.

We maintain that susceptibility to division is a negative determination because susceptibility as such is a negative determination; susceptibility to division must therefore also be a negative determination. We maintain that susceptibility as such is a negative determination because, if it were something positively existent, it would be one of the attributes of the thing judged