in some direction—this judgment must have a cause. The proof is that this judgment does not apply to nonexistent things, whereas it does apply to these existing things. Unless some feature distinguished those things to which this judgment applies from those to which it does not, no such distinction could exist.

The second premise establishes that this judgment cannot be explained specifically by something’s being a substance or by its being an accident. The proof is that, if being a substance were what necessitated this judgment, substance would admit of division into that which is spatially coincident with something else and that which is separate from it. Yet this is known to be impossible, since a substance cannot be spatially coincident with something else. The same reasoning shows that being an accident is not what necessitates this judgment, since an accident cannot be separate from something else in some direction.

The third premise establishes that this judgment is not explained by temporal origination. Several arguments demonstrate this. First, temporal origination means existence preceded by nonexistence. Nonexistence forms no part of the cause; once nonexistence is excluded from consideration, nothing remains