of this entails denying His life and power, as previously explained in recounting their position. They say that His occupying one spatial locus rather than another is a relation to that locus. All rational people agree that nothing precludes new relations from arising or earlier ones from ceasing. For the two positions concerning the Throne and the like also apply to the nonexistent spatial locus, which is a notional determination of place. Whoever says that rising over the Throne is merely a relation can say the same here; whoever says that it involves movement says the same here.

The twenty-sixth response: Regarding your statement, “His being in a spatial locus is either necessary or not necessary,” your opponent gives you a qualified answer: occupying a spatial locus as such is necessary, but occupying one particular spatial locus rather than another is possible, not necessary. This is because, in the prevalent terminology of the speculative theologians, a spatial locus is a notional determination of place. They say that anything occupying a spatial locus necessarily has spatial occupancy in general. As for a particular spatial locus, that which occupies it may move away from it—as, for example, if Allah willed to move the world from one spatial locus to another. They then hold two positions on this matter: