a particular spatial locus, and that whatever is thus cannot come to occupy a spatial locus. For a spatial locus is a notional determination of place, not an existing entity. Why, then, do you say that if He did not occupy a particular spatial locus in pre-eternity, He could not occupy a particular spatial locus thereafter? This rests on the question of newly occurring things inhering in Him, which has already been discussed.

The twenty-fifth response: Your statement, “Whatever is thus cannot come to occupy a spatial locus,” is rejected by your opponent, who says: “We do not concede that every instance of occupying a particular spatial locus—which is a notional determination of place—is temporally originated, or that He cannot come to occupy a spatial locus that He did not previously occupy. Rather, the Living, All-Powerful—glorified be He—occupies whichever spatial loci He wills. This does not entail His being confined to a particular spatial locus, nor does it entail that spatial occupancy itself is temporally originated. Rather, He—glorified and exalted be He—creates whatever bodies He wills, and a body is not created in a spatial locus, nor is it confined to one; rather, He may move it from one spatial locus to another.” These thinkers say that His life and power necessitate this, and that denying the possibility