Our purpose here is to discuss these two arguments—division and spatial location—as he presents them in his Nihāya, although they have already been discussed. We therefore say: Regarding his statement, “If He is in more than one spatial region, He must be divisible,” we do not concede that this entails His divisibility. Nor do we concede that the spatial region is divisible, such that whatever occupies it must be divisible. Even if it were divisible, we would not concede that everything occupying something divisible must itself be divisible.

The fourteenth point: It has already been explained more than once that what is most often meant by this division is the distinction between one part and another. We have explained that this is like the distinction between attributes, and that everyone must acknowledge this concerning every existent. Denying it entails denying all existing things, necessary and contingent alike. We have also explained that the expressions used in this connection, such as dependence