And as for your assertion, “What occupies one of the two spatial regions must be either identical with what occupies the other or distinct from it,” you may be answered: “It is neither identical with it nor distinct from it,” or: “It is not said to be identical with it, nor is it said to be distinct from it.” This has already been explained repeatedly on the principle adopted by many—or most—of the theologians who affirm the divine attributes: two things are distinct if one can exist without the other, or can be separated from it in place, time, or existence. On this basis, the objections you have raised concerning identity and distinctness do not arise.

If, however, by a single spatial region you mean something larger than the locus of an indivisible atom, then whatever occupies it need not be the smallest possible thing. The argument from smallness has thus been invalidated. Necessity and possibility will be discussed later.

The thirteenth response: It may be said that this argument comprises two arguments. The first is the argument from divisibility or smallness, which applies to all the alternatives. The second consists of additional objections specific to each alternative. We shall address both arguments together: one is the argument from divisibility and composition, while the other is a form of the argument from the similarity of bodies.

These two arguments encompass all that the proponents of negation put forward on this subject, for their arguments ultimately come down to composition and likeness. We have already discussed what is impossible in these respects and what is not, and have explained that Sūrat al-Ikhlās, “Say: He is Allah