and is not in itself divided or multiple. If that is so, it is incorrect to say that whatever occupies it must occupy either a single spatial region or multiple spatial regions. This presupposes multiplicity within the spatial region, which is not conceded. To explain: people have disagreed over whether a body is one in itself or is multiple, containing actual divisions according to one view, as previously related. It has also been shown that the author of al-Ta’sīs offered no argument establishing that a body is divided and lacks unity. If this is so, even though a body unquestionably admits of division, then a spatial region, in which actual division is inconceivable, has an even stronger claim to contain neither multiplicity nor division. This is evident.

Indeed, the ninth response is that a spatial region’s being divided in itself before anything occupies it is categorically impossible, whether a body is held to be one or divided in itself. This is because “spatial region” here does not mean something existent, as he himself has established; rather, it is merely a conception of place. This is what many speculative theologians mean by the term “spatial region.” If that is so, it is impossible for one part of it to be distinct from another before it is occupied by something that determines its dimensions. This is known through sensory perception and rational necessity. Nor can anyone say that its parts are distinguished by pointing to them, for it is impossible to point to what does not exist; only something existent can be pointed to. And if a spatial region is neither multiple nor divided before something comes to occupy it