And if that is so, it may be said: either a spatial region necessarily entails that what occupies it is a body or an indivisible substance, or it does not. If it does, then whatever is associated with a spatial region can only be a body or an indivisible substance. Consequently, denying both that He is a body and that He is an indivisible substance entails that He is not spatially located—as al-Mu’assis and others sometimes argue. Yet this contradicts the stated premise, which is to deny spatial region and direction without basing this on the denial of corporeality, in refutation of those who say that He is not a body but is nevertheless in a spatial region and a direction. If this proof cannot be established without denying corporeality, it collapses at its very foundation.

Whenever a spatial region necessarily entails a body or an indivisible substance, negating the necessary consequent—being a body or an indivisible substance—entails negating that which necessitates it, namely, the spatial region.

If, however, a spatial region does not necessarily entail a body or an indivisible substance, then what occupies it need not be either. In that case, there is no necessity to say that it is divided according to the divisions of what occupies it: if its occupant is an indivisible substance, the spatial region is one; and if its occupant is a body, the spatial region is one or more than one. For, on this hypothesis, what occupies it is neither a body nor an indivisible substance. Thus, on this hypothesis, his division of spatial region into one or more than one is not necessary, while on the first hypothesis the proof is invalid. This demonstrates its invalidity on both hypotheses.

The sixth response is to say: suppose it is not conceded that a spatial region necessarily entails that what occupies it is a body, and it is not conceded that denying corporeality does not entail denying