and are existent. This would invalidate his claim in the argument that His being in a spatial region can be neither necessary nor contingent. If, however, a spatial region is nonexistent, it is not valid to say that He must be either in one spatial region or in two. This entails the invalidity of one of the two lines of reasoning he presented in this argument: first, that He must be either in one spatial region or in two; and second, that His being in a spatial region can be neither necessary nor contingent.

The fourth response clarifies this: the existent spatial regions necessarily belonging to a spatially located thing are its boundaries and outer limit, while the nonexistent ones are what is called the hypothetical determination of place. If by “spatial region” he means something existent, his argument ruling out a spatial region necessarily belonging to Him is rejected. If he means something nonexistent, its division into one and many is rejected.

If it is said, “A nonexistent spatial region, which is the hypothetical determination of place, is delimited and multiplied according to the oneness or multiplicity of what occupies it: if what occupies it is a single substance, it is one; if it consists of multiple substances, it is multiple,” the reply is the fifth response: he began this question by discussing spatial region with those who say that He is not a body, yet is nonetheless associated with a direction. Moreover, when presenting the argument, he himself said: “Once this is established, it is established that denying that a thing is a body does not entail denying its association with a direction and a spatial region.”