and denying it. This is a mutual entailment between two contradictories.

If, however, by “free of composition” he means free of composition from dissimilar parts, and by “simple” he means that which contains no such composition, this does not entail that every part is an indivisible atom. Rather, each of those parts may be simple in such a way that the simple contains dissimilar parts. This is closer to what he intends.

It may therefore be said to you: those simple parts themselves differ in their essential natures, as you have stated. If their essential natures differ, this does not preclude their sharing what is necessary, possible, or impossible for them. But if they cannot share these things, it does not follow that one must touch what the other touches.

Even supposing that the sides of one of them are alike, either because it is round or because its right and left sides are alike, its right side must touch what its left side touches only if the object touching it can move from its right to its left, ceasing to touch what it touched while on its right and coming into contact with what it touches when on its left. For while touching this part, it must also touch something else. This would hold only if the other parts to the right and left of the first were alike, whereas the assumption is that the parts differ in their essential natures.

Thus, even if each is simple and has homogeneous parts, it does not follow that whatever is separate from one of these substances is also separate from another. This can be known only if they are alike, whereas the assumption is that they are