that is created, together with its accidents, may be separated by Allah Most High. Even if this entails its transformation and a change in its reality, Allah Most High is capable of doing so, and there is no objection to it. As for the Lord’s attributes, such as His life, knowledge, and power, they cannot be separated from His essence, because that would entail the Lord’s transformation and a change in His reality, which is impossible. The cessation of His essential attributes is therefore impossible. The fact that other existents can lose their attributes does not mean that Allah Most High can be said to lose His attributes. Likewise, the fact that other things possessing magnitude can have their parts separated does not mean that this is possible for Him, since it would entail a change in His reality, which is impossible.

If the parts are said to be alike, this requires them to share in the impossibility of nonexistence and a change in reality, just as the attributes share in this impossibility despite not being alike. Parts that are alike must therefore share in it all the more.

The fifteenth argument is that your statement, “They must be either alike in essence or different in essence,” is not an exhaustive division, because likeness and difference presuppose distinctness. We do not concede that any one of them may be said to be identical with another, such that it could then be called like or unlike it; nor is it said to be one and the same with it. As many—or most—of those who affirm the attributes say concerning knowledge, power, and life: “Any one of them, even if