a body is nothing but those atoms and their composition. If their state without composition is supposed to be the same as their state when composed, they must possess, when separated, the attributes they possessed when united. Yet sense perception and self-evident knowledge establish that this is false, since, when the parts of most bodies separate, most of their attributes and properties cease to exist. If their state when separated differs from their state when united, their likeness does not entail the possibility of their separation, since separation entails a change in their state.

A thing is no closer to its like than it is to itself. Thus, if something that differs from another in some respect need not be like it, then, a fortiori, a single thing need not retain its likeness to itself if moving from one spatial location to another necessarily changes its reality.

The thirteenth argument may therefore be stated as follows: the likeness of the two requires them to share whatever is necessary, possible, and impossible for them. Now, any one of them cannot be separated from its own essence, since that would entail its transformation and a change in its reality. The Necessary Existent cannot be subject to anything that leads to its transformation or a change in its reality. Thus, given their likeness, they must share in the impossibility of undergoing transformation or a change in their reality. This requires that separation be equally impossible for them, since separation would nullify their reality.

This is further clarified by the fourteenth argument, namely that the attributes of a body