cannot cease to exist, nor can His essential attributes be separated from Him. Thus, supposing that He is upon the Throne and is of great magnitude, with one side distinguishable from another, whatever falls within the referent of His name would be among the inseparable realities that cannot depart from His essence. The union and continuity attributed to Him would be intrinsically necessary for Him, because He is al-Samad (the One who admits no separation), as explained earlier. This is evident.

If this is necessary, then even supposing that the parts are alike does not entail that separation is possible. For the necessity of union and continuity requires the place and spatial position of each part to be intrinsic to its actual individual identity. The fact that two things are alike does not mean that one must possess the attributes peculiar to the other’s individual identity. Moreover, what necessitates union and continuity is the essence’s necessary existence together with its inseparable attributes. If that is so, and the two parts in contact become separated, while the two separated parts come into contact, without the essence’s union and continuity being as they previously were, then neither would have taken the other’s place or served as its substitute. Hence, they would not be alike.

This is further established by the eleventh argument: Suppose that the parts are alike. You say, “Whatever is possible for either of two like things is possible for the other.” On this basis, it must be concluded with certainty that two parts in contact can become separated, and that two separated parts can become