they have a magnitude of their own and are not individual atoms, for that is the assumption. This being so, it does not follow that an outermost part can become a middle part, because the outermost part is indivisible, and an indivisible part cannot take the place of a large part that is divisible. Consequently, it does not follow that parts in contact can move apart or that separated parts can come into contact, since their magnitudes and shapes differ. Whatever takes the place of something else must equal it in both attributes and magnitude. This is especially so since, on this assumption, some parts may be larger than others: all that follows, at most, is that each part must be capable of division, so that they may properly be judged capable of being resolved into indivisible parts, thereby making his argument concerning the second alternative applicable. If nothing more than this is required, their equality in magnitude does not follow. If their equality in magnitude does not follow, they need not be capable of taking one another’s place, and thus the possibility of separation and disintegration does not follow.

In sum, if he assumes these parts to be divisible, their magnitudes and properties may differ, so it does not follow that they can take one another’s place. On either assumption, his claim that separation and disintegration necessarily follow is therefore invalid.

The tenth argument is to say: The essence whose existence is necessary in itself, and whose attributes are inseparable from it, cannot be described in the same terms as a contingent essence whose existence is merely possible. Created bodies have constituent parts and attributes: Allah may separate their parts and remove their attributes from them, just as He may cause them to cease to exist; whereas Allah, glorified and exalted be He,