to what is adjacent to it, and its particular location. No other thing can take its place with respect to that attribute, even if it is like it, as explained above. Thus, their being alike does not entail that what is in contact becomes distant, or that what is distant comes into contact.

When we say, “Whatever is possible for one of two things that are alike is possible for the other,” this applies only to what is not peculiar to the individual. Contact and distance are among the properties peculiar to the individual. For if something that is in contact becomes distant, it leaves its particular location and ceases to be in contact with what it previously contacted; it must then come into contact with something else. The same applies to what is distant. Its individual attributes would then differ as a result of separation. This is therefore not a necessary consequence of the two things being alike; resemblance does not entail it.

The eighth response is to say: These things you have called parts—whether they are parts posited in thought or are truly distinct—must each mean either an indivisible part, namely an atom, or something larger. If by parts you mean atoms, and you have said that they are either alike in essence or different, you may be asked: Suppose they differ in essence; what follows from that?

As for your statement, “The second alternative is to say that those parts differ in essence. We say: For every body composed of parts differing in essence, there must be an endpoint to the analysis