dissolution into what has no composition, the other does so as well; otherwise, neither does. Thus, what you have said about composition in terms of magnitude is met with exactly the same counterargument. You may be told: If composition and dissolution into what has no composition are not necessitated, this is not necessary in either case, and the argument is invalid. But if this is necessitated through the dissolution of magnitude into a part without composition, then an attribute must likewise dissolve into a part that is itself an attribute without composition.

If it is said that the parts of magnitude are alike, since otherwise they would be composite, the same may be said of the parts of a quality: they are alike, since otherwise they would be composite. If it is said that their likeness entails that whatever is possible for one is possible for another, the same may be said of those other parts: their likeness entails that whatever is possible for one is possible for another. Knowledge would then have to be described in the same terms as power, and life in the same terms as speech, with each taking the place of the other.

Besides being impossible, this entails that one attribute could suffice in place of all the others. That, in turn, entails that these attributes are not necessary to the essence. This is a more far-reaching consequence than the one he imposed in the case of magnitude: the possibility of the essence dissolving and dispersing. For the loss of the qualities of an existent or a body is more decisive in bringing about its nonexistence