that is fixed. This is al-Shahrastānī’s position. Although he sometimes disparages this view, he has been compelled to agree with it. Yet this establishes, at most, that bodies in general can be divided, meaning that the nature of a body, simply as a body, does not preclude division. This is true, for some bodies actually undergo division. If the very nature of a body precluded division, no body could be divided.

But this does not establish his claim that every body admits of division, much less that the Most High, the Magnificent, the Great, the Supremely Exalted, who is upon His mighty Throne, is composed of parts, as he has alleged. For if a body is one, and divisibility has been established only for some bodies, it does not follow that the Lord of the worlds is divided or admits of division. Thus He is not composed of parts, whether actually existing parts or hypothetical, possible parts.

Moreover, if their views concerning the composition and division of observable bodies have been inconsistent, or they have been bewildered about these matters and counted them among the questions that confound reason, how can they legitimately make such judgments about the Lord of the worlds, whether by negation or affirmation? This is clear. There is neither power nor strength except through Allah.