unity unless it is determinate and distinct from other things”—by which you mean beforehand. In that case, the argument is likewise invalid. Thus, whether unity is this determinacy and distinctness or something else, it does not follow that unity’s inherence in a body depends upon another unity. This is clear, whether unity is a positive reality or a privation. The purpose here is not to discuss this at length, but merely to point out that the argument used to establish that a body involves division, composition, and multiplicity, and is not one, is among the most unsound of arguments. For he has built upon this corrupt premise much of his Jahmī doctrine and denial of the divine attributes, through which he denied the reality of Allah’s names and attributes and what He is in His essence.

As for whether a body admits of infinitely many divisions or not, that is not our concern here. He argued against such divisibility by appealing to motion: it exists in the present; otherwise, it would not exist in