susceptible to division, can conceivably be one. The second is whether, assuming it can be one, it can conceivably admit of infinitely many divisions.”

He said: “We shall discuss each of these two cases, then present the objections of those who deny this and address them.”

He said: “The principal argument that whatever admits of division must already be divided is this: the unity of a body is either something other than its being a body, an intrinsic part of it, or something external to it. If the first or second is the case, separating the body into parts would entail bringing it out of existence, which is impossible. If the third is the case, unity would be an attribute subsisting in the body. Yet an accident cannot arise in a substrate or be present in it unless that substrate is determinate and distinct from anything else. Nothing is understood by its unity except its being determinate in itself and distinct from anything else. It follows that unity’s subsistence in the body depends upon the body’s being one. The same argument then applies to that unity as to the first, entailing an infinite regress, which is impossible. Even supposing such a regress to be possible, it must