arguing from an opponent’s agreement to a premise on grounds which, if accepted, invalidate the argument based on that premise, and which, if rejected, leave the premise open to denial.

The same applies here. The opponent who concedes to you that division and disintegration are impossible for Him concedes this only because He is al-Samad, who must be a master and a unified whole, and cannot be divided. If this basis is sound, your use of that concession to argue that He cannot be a unified whole is invalid. If this basis is unsound, then the impossibility of His division has not been conceded to you. Thus, this concession benefits you neither in reasoning nor in debate.

Your opponent could say: “I do not concede to you that division is impossible for Him on the grounds that He must be al-Samad. Being al-Samad entails being a unified whole. If, however, it is assumed not to entail this, then it does not exclude division—or does not exclude both unity and division.” No one can claim that this name signifies the exclusion of both unity and division, or the exclusion of division alone, except on the basis that a unified whole depends upon its parts, or similar arguments already discussed. As for inferential reasoning, he has presented no proof that division is impossible for Him. It is therefore clear that what he has presented is no proof at all.

This is further established by the third point: undoubtedly, Allah, glorified is He, is holy and exalted above the possibility of division and fragmentation. Yet the recognition of this by people’s innate dispositions is no stronger than their recognition that He is exalted above nonexistence and extinction. Rather,