His death except through the necessity of His life; nor did I know that ignorance and powerlessness were impossible for Him except through the necessity of His knowledge and power; nor did I know that nonexistence was impossible for Him except through the necessity of His existence.

If someone disputed what I affirm, saying that He is not joined together, or is not knowing, or is neither living nor powerful, or does not exist, and then asked me to agree that separation, nonexistence, death, ignorance, powerlessness and the like are impossible for Him, he would be asking me to agree that one of two opposites is impossible without affirming the other—which is an attribute of perfection, or is not an attribute of imperfection, or is not, in my view, an attribute of imperfection. He would then be like those heretics who ask me to agree that He is neither dead, powerless nor ignorant, while disputing our affirmation that He is living, knowing and powerful.

If someone asks us to agree to affirm something without its necessary consequence, so that he may use this agreement to argue against that consequence, we are under no obligation to agree with him; indeed, we must not agree. Denying the necessary consequence entails denying that which entails it. Thus, if we agreed with him in affirming that which entails it, we would in reality be agreeing with him in denying the very thing whose affirmation we had outwardly accepted. If agreeing to affirm something entails denying it, such agreement is impermissible.

Thus, if the heretic says, “You agree that He is neither dead, ignorant nor powerless, but I do not agree with you that He is living, knowing and powerful,” his purpose is to use the negation of these attributes to argue that both they and their opposites are absent, by saying: “His being living, knowing and powerful, and dead, ignorant and powerless, entails that He is