And since this distinction is unavoidable even where there is likeness, two distinct things—whether alike or different—must each be distinguished from the other by its own individual essence and attributes, including its spatial location. It does not follow that the other must share these, for that would eliminate their distinctness. Accordingly, it does not follow that every created body, even a simple one, must have its edge occupy the position of its centre and its centre occupy the position of its edge, or that the particular attribute and spatial location belonging to one must belong to the other, and vice versa. This is especially so when those like parts are not separate or distinguished from one another by being apart, but instead constitute a single continuous thing.

Moreover, if its parts are alike, the possibility of parts that are far apart separating, and of separated parts moving apart, is conditional upon the body admitting of division. Otherwise, if we posit a simple body that cannot be divided and whose parts are alike, we cannot say that parts which are far apart may come into contact, or that parts in contact may move apart. The possibility of this is conditional upon the possibility of separation.

Furthermore, if the two are alike, and it is of the very nature of one of them that separation is impossible