Moreover, those who affirm the existence of parts know that a simple body was not composed of parts in the sense that the parts were first brought into being and it was then assembled from them. Thus, his expression “composed of parts” amounts to one thing being distinct from another. At most, one might say that one part is distinct from another, just as some of the early generations are reported to have used the word “part.”

His subsequent statement is: “They must either be alike in essence or different. The former is impossible, because on this supposition some of these like parts would be separated and others in contact. Whatever is possible for either of two like things is possible for the other. It must therefore be concluded with certainty that two parts in contact can become separated, and two separated parts can come into contact.”

The response is that being alike in essence does not entail that one is the very same individual as the other, nor that it shares the properties necessarily associated with the other’s particular identity and what follows from that. To explain this: if it is said, “In the case of two things that are alike, there can apply to each individual one