side in place, even though it is not separate from it in time or existence. Yet it may be said that this does not constitute separation in place. These are verbal disputes over terminology.

Moreover, otherness is even less applicable between an attribute and its subject, or between a part and the whole, than between one attribute and another, or between one part and another. Thus, they say that one of the ten is neither identical to the ten nor other than them, and that a person’s hand is neither identical to the person nor other than him. But they do not say that one of the ten is neither identical to another one nor other than it, or that a person’s hand is neither his foot nor other than it. Rather, it is other than it, since either can exist without the other, whereas the whole cannot exist without its parts.

This concerns created bodies, which admit of separation. As for the Creator, glorified is He, separation is impossible for Him. They therefore do not say that this side of Him is other than that side, and thus reject the first premise.

If he says, “By ‘other’ I mean something broader than this: that one can be known without the other, or that one can physically point to one without pointing to the other”—as one of the early generations said to someone who asked him about the words of the Most High:

“No vision can encompass Him.” [Al-Anʿām 103]

“Do you not see the sky?”

He replied, “Yes.”

He said: