that side, nor that it is other than it, unless he establishes that either can exist without the other. Yet he appeals to this distinctness to establish the possibility of separation. This is invalid circular reasoning: he cannot establish that they are two distinct things in this sense until he establishes that they can be separated, and he cannot establish that they can be separated until he establishes that they are two distinct things. This is circular reasoning.

If, concerning the sides of created bodies, one says that this side is other than that side, this is because either can exist without the other. Allah, glorified and exalted, however, is al-Samad; division and separation are impossible for Him, as explained earlier. This name entails cohesion and strength and precludes division and separation. If His being al-Samad is necessary, then cohesion is necessary for Him, and division is impossible for His essence. A brief discussion of this has already been given.

Someone who defines two distinct things as things that can be separated from one another in time, place, or existence may say that, among attributes such as knowledge, power, and life, no attribute is identical to another, nor is it other than it, because the attributes subsist in one and the same subject. As for boundaries, they may say that this side is separate from that