the world, there was nothing but sheer void and pure nonexistence”—we have already explained this. Here it suffices to say: We do not concede that a spatial region is something existent. If nothing existent is there, then his statement that something “occupies that spatial region” means no more than that it exists in its own right and can be pointed to.

His statement, “If it were situated in a particular spatial region, its occupying that spatial region would mean that it excludes anything else,” does not hold unless he establishes that being situated in a particular spatial region is itself equivalent to occupying it. He has not done so. If being situated in a particular spatial region means being bounded by that which encloses it on its sides, it does not have that meaning. If it means being specifically related to the extent of a place as measured by what occupies a spatial region, then being situated in a spatial region in this sense necessarily entails occupying a spatial region. There is therefore no need for the argument he presents to establish that it occupies a spatial region.

As for its preventing anything else from being where it is, this depends on the interpenetration of bodies; it is not part of the very nature of something that occupies a spatial region. For something is known to occupy a spatial region before it is known to prevent anything else from being where it is.

The third point concerns his statement: “The essence characterized by these three properties must, in itself, possess volume and magnitude