separate from Him, such as the Throne? Likewise, by ‘direction,’ do you mean something existent and separate from Him, or do you mean His being such that He can be pointed to and perceived, even if nothing else exists there?”

If by “spatial region” he means the first meaning—something inseparable from everything that occupies a spatial region—and if by “direction” he means His being such that He can be pointed to without anything existing separate from Him, we do not concede that this is not necessary. This distinction makes clear the answer to the arguments he has mentioned.

As for his statement, “Other entities need not occupy that spatial region, and the same applies here,” he may be told: Rather, every entity that occupies a spatial region must have its own particular spatial occupancy, namely its dimensions and the boundary encompassing it. It necessarily also has a spatial region in the sense of a conceived place, which has no actual existence. Yet its particular spatial occupancy and spatial region—which is its boundary—need not be the very same as those of another entity, just as this entity itself need not be the very same as the other. For its spatial region, understood in this sense, is included in what is denoted by its essence, its self, and its individual identity. Two things that are alike need not be one and the same; no rational person would claim otherwise. This is self-evident and undisputed. That would hold even if it were conceded that bodies are all alike—how much more so when it has already been shown that this view is false.