it. Rather, describing something as reaching Him or not reaching Him amounts to the same thing, as the Jahmiyyah maintain. For in their view, it is inconceivable that anything should reach Allah, that any matter should return to Him or ultimately pass to Him, or that anyone should be brought back to Him—especially according to those among them who profess union with creation and say that He is everywhere. Likewise, they cannot conceive of anything descending from Him, ascending to Him, or rising to Him.

This is not the place to establish that argument. The point here is simply that his statement, “A thing said to be infinite is of two kinds, the first being that which is not confined to a direction or spatial domain,” is an unfamiliar claim. It is not known for anything to be described as infinite in this sense at all, unless it is nonexistent or extends infinitely in every direction, as is postulated for spatial dimensions.

The sixth point: This argument is countered by the reality and attributes unique to Allah, glorified be He. Being distinguished by an attribute is like being distinguished by a magnitude. He is distinguished by life, knowledge, power, and other attributes: He has specific attributes whose opposites and contradictories He cannot possess. An argument parallel to what he said concerning magnitude can therefore be made concerning these attributes: either the attributes are finite, or they are infinite in one respect but not another.