equal to its own size, and so forth. That being so, in an extension that is finite on one side but not the other, the two sides share the same nature only in attribute and quality, not in magnitude, since one is certainly larger than the other. It therefore does not follow that the infinite admits diminution and separation.

Furthermore, even if whatever is possible for one must be possible for the other, your statement, “That entails the possibility of separation and joining, increase and decrease, with respect to the essence of Allah, exalted is He,” is precisely the argument against His being finite—namely, that what is finite admits increase and decrease. You have already been told that this is not conceded in the case of that whose existence is necessary in itself: His attributes are inseparable from His essence, so He cannot be other than He is. Thus, we say that the objects of His knowledge are more numerous than the things within His power, and that the things within His power are more numerous than His creations and the objects of His will. Although this is not a parallel case, the purpose is to draw attention to the preceding discussion of such matters.

Moreover, you have provided no proof that separation and joining, increase and decrease, are impossible. If you appeal to consensus on this, the argument would rest on transmitted evidence. If you are content to rely on people’s aversion to this, then people’s aversion to