The supposition is that, in this case, the three arguments are in some respect weaker than in the other case.

As for the second argument, you say: “The side assumed to be infinite and the other side must either be identical in nature and essence or not be so. The first alternative entails that whatever is possible for either side must also be possible for the other, which entails the possibility of separation and joining, increase and decrease.”

The reply is that one thing’s sharing another’s nature does not entail equality in magnitude, as with different quantities of silver, of gold, and of other bodies of the same nature. They are identical in nature despite differing in magnitude. Accordingly, whatever is possible for one is possible for another only in the respects in which they are alike—namely, attribute and quality. As for matters relating to magnitude, the large is not like the small, nor is whatever is possible for one possible for the other. Rather, the small has properties that cannot hold of the large, and the large has properties that cannot hold of the small, such as occupying a region of space