This is demonstrated by the fact that al-Rāzī treated His separateness from His creation as being of the same kind as His separateness from spatial location—which, as explained earlier, need not exist. Thus, they have affirmed His separateness from the world as being of the same kind as the separateness of something existent from something nonexistent, or of something nonexistent from something else nonexistent. Yet the world undoubtedly exists, so they have effectively made Him nonexistent. This is the true import of their position, even if they themselves may not realize it, for such is the condition of those who are astray.

The thirty-sixth argument: Suppose they have affirmed for Him a separateness that is intelligible in the case of some existing things. His separateness from creation must nevertheless be greater than the separateness of any one thing from another. They must therefore affirm for Him a separateness greater than that of an accident from another accident or from its substrate, and greater than that of one substance from another. This requires affirming for Him separateness in attribute, which is called separateness in reality and quality, as well as separateness in magnitude, which is called separateness in direction or quantity, although His separateness