is plain to anyone who reflects on it. It is thus clear that he has offered no argument to establish that difference in reality does not entail direction.

The thirty-first point: It may be said that all known separation and distinction in reality and essence involves direction. Such distinction is either between two substances or bodies, together with what subsists in them, each being separate from the other in direction; or between two accidents in one and the same substance or entity, such as its taste, colour, smell, knowledge, and power; or between an entity and its attributes and accidents, as in the distinction between a body and its taste, colour, and smell.

In the latter two cases, neither of the things involved is without direction either. A substance occupies space in its own right, unlike the accident inhering in it, which occupies space through its dependence on something else. Likewise, two attributes or accidents subsist in something that occupies space, even though one is not distinguished from the other by its locus. Thus, among existing things whose separation and distinction are known, none is devoid of direction and spatial location.

If it is said, “But one accident is distinct from the other in its reality, although they share the same locus,” the reply is:

The thirty-second point: Any two things that subsist