a reality or essence by which it can be distinguished from anything else. Even if it were assumed that it needed to be distinguished from something else, the discussion would concern that case and the separation between two existing things—namely, the separation between Allah and the world.

That being so, his appeal to the separation between Allah and direction to establish that separation between two existing things is a matter of reality rather than direction is valid only if direction is something that actually exists. Yet this is precisely the point disputed by his opponent, who maintains that the direction ascribed to Allah Most High is not something that exists. For saying that the Creator is in a direction means nothing more than that He is apart from the world, distinct from it, and separate from it. This does not entail the existence of anything besides Allah’s essence.

Thus, if he argues that the separation between Allah Most High and the world is merely a matter of reality, and that separation in reality does not entail direction—as in the Lord’s separation from direction—then he has conceded in this reply that direction is something that exists. This begs the question, since he makes the very proposition to be proved a premise in its own proof.

His opponent says: ‘I do not concede that direction is something that exists, such that one could say that Allah Most High is distinct from an existing thing without direction.’ For the dispute arose only over its existence. This is the very question at issue, so how can he argue for its existence by a proof that itself relies upon its existence? And this