is such that the nonexistence of that other thing entails its own nonexistence. Anything of this kind is contingent in itself, and this is impossible in the case of that which is necessarily existent in itself.”

It may be said in reply: If a thing depends on something else that has no need of it, such that the nonexistence of the second entails the nonexistence of the first, or the first cannot exist without the second, then anything of this kind is indeed contingent in itself. But if the second is not independent of the first, and instead depends on it such that the nonexistence of the first entails its own nonexistence, then there is no more reason to deem the first contingent because it depends on the second than to deem the second contingent because it depends on the first. In that case, both must be necessarily existent, if it is established that each needs the other in the same way that the other needs it. How much more so here, where the subject entails the attribute.

This becomes clear from the eighteenth point: It has already been established that “other” here does not mean something separate from it, but something distinguishable in thought, and that the intended meaning of dependence is mutual entailment. Thus, the meaning is that the subject