all rational people and is known by rational necessity. Such distinctions are therefore unavoidable in the case of every existent, for one knows one thing and then another. If the existence of these distinctions entails Allah’s dependence upon something other than Himself, this consequence follows on every assumption and for all rational people. Thus, on this interpretation, it cannot constitute an objection.

It therefore becomes clear that his statement, “He would depend for His existence upon something other than Himself,” is answered either by denying the entailment or by denying that the consequence must be ruled out. This is because the word “other” has different meanings, as is evident by rational necessity and the agreement of rational people. If “other” means something that can be separate in existence, time, or place, the first premise—his statement, “He would depend upon something other than Himself”—is rejected. For the existent spatial locus that necessarily accompanies Him cannot be separate from Him.

If, however, “other” means two things of which one may be known without the other, the existence of such distinctions with respect to Allah is known by rational necessity and the agreement of rational people, even though some of them do not use the word “other” for this. For what matters here is